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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990739-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from conditional guilty pleas to the second-degree felony charges of
operating a clandestine laboratory, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37(d)-4(l)(a) and/or
(b) (1998); and illegal possession and/or use of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and -8(2)(d) (Supp. 1999) (in Add. A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Are charges "pending" for purposes ofthe 120-day intrastate speedy trial statute when
an information has not yet been filed?
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Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Harlev, 1999UTApp. 197,ffl[9,10,982 P.2d 1145: State v. Preece. 971
P.2d 1,4 (Utah App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in Addendum B, including: Utah
Code Ann. §77-29-1(1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying Utah's
statute involving the intrastate speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the
relevant dates and corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows:
7/23/98

Defendant is arrested and booked on charges of operating a
clandestine laboratory, possession of a controlled substance,
possession of an incendiary device, and driving on a
revoked/suspended license (R. 50).

08/03/98

A document entitled "Information on Parole Violation" is
generated, alleging that defendant violated his parole by
manufacturing a controlled substance, manufacturing an
explosive device, and possessing an explosive, firearm or
dangerous weapon (R. 54). Defendant's parole is revoked and
he is returned to prison (R. 74).

10/06/98

Defendant files a "Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charges[f under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999),
seeking disposition of "[c]harges of poss of a controld [sic]
substance, poss of bomb/incendiary [sic] [, and] poss of a
clandestine lab" (R. 51) (in Add. C).

\

<

I
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03/02/99

An information is filed charging defendant with operating a
clandestine lab (with an enhancement), possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (with an enhancement) (R.
1-3) (in Add. C).1

04/07/99

Defendant moves pro se to dismiss the charges for lack of a
speedy trial, claiming the 120-day period began to run when he
filed his disposition request on Oct. 6, 1998, and ended on
February 3, 1999 (R. 15-19).

04/19/99

A hearing is held on defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 46).

04/30/99

The magistrate enters findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 57-59).

05/03/99

The magistrate enters an order denying defendant's motion to
dismiss (R. 60).

07/06/99

After bindover, defendant, through new counsel, files a motion
to renew his motion to dismiss, seeking to have the district court
judge review the magistrate's decision (R. 132-37).

07/16/99

The district court denies defendant's motion to dismiss and
adopts/approves the findings, conclusions and order of the
magistrate (R. 151-52) (in Add. D).

07/20/99

Defendant enters his guilty pleas to two counts: 1) operating a
clandestine lab, and 2) possession of a controlled substance,
enhanced due to a prior conviction (R. 216-17). The pleas are
entered pursuant to Sery, preserving for appeal the statutory
speedy trial issue, among others (R. 216-19).2 To avoid

*Two of the charges were enhanced because, among other things, the lab was
found within 500 feet of a residence and defendant had a previous conviction for
possession of a controlled substance (R. 1-3). Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(d) and 5837d-5(f).
2

State v.Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988).

3
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difficulties arising from defendant's impending release from
prison due to the imminent completion of his sentence for an
unrelated matter, the lower court immediately sentences
defendant on one of the charges, imposing a sentence of one-tofifteen years for operating a clandestine lab, and orders
preparation of a presentence report for use in sentencing
defendant for possession (R. 218-19).
08/20/99

The lower court sentences defendant to a term of one-to-fifteen
years on the possession charge, to run concurrently with the
sentence on the clandestine lab conviction (R. 240-41).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 23, 1998, defendant was a parolee subject to the supervision of Adult
Probation and Parole (AP&P) (R. 334:17-18). After being informed by police that two
independent tips and officer surveillance suggested that defendant was involved in a
methamphetamine lab, AP&P conducted a long-overdue home visit on defendant's residence
and found in his garage a large, locked steel box (R. 334:8-13, 18-22, 48-51, 53-56, 65-66,
103-04, 113). Someone living at the home identified it as belonging to "dad," and the key
which opened the box was on a ring marked with the word "DAD" (R. 334:55-56, 62, 82,
105,114; 141). Inside the box was a quantity of items, including glassware, chemicals, and
explosives, associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 334: 22-23, 62-63;

<

143-44). Also in the box was an item identified as a "shotgun" and described as a small,
homemade object three-to-four inches long that can be "fired from inside the hand by simply
pounding down on the back of a little loaded 12-[gauge] shell" (R. 334: 85; 337: 6-7, 11).

I
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Based on the items seized from defendant's garage, the previous independent observations
of the police officers, and the independent tips, defendant was arrested (R. 334: 80, 84-85).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Utah's intrastate speedy trial statute applies only to "pending" informations or
indictments. Because no information had been filed at the time defendant filed his speedy
trial request, the statute was not properly invoked and the request did not trigger the 120-day
period. To rule otherwise would impose a 120-day statute of limitations on the charging and
trial of all incarcerated defendants, even though the incarceration is based on unrelated
charges. Such a rule would also require commencement of a criminal prosecution as early
as the date of a defendant's arrest and unreasonably bind the prosecution's ability to
investigate, prepare, file, and prosecute felony cases. Both the plain language of the speedy
trial statute and Utah Supreme Court case law is to the contrary.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL DID
NOT INVOKE THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE BECAUSE NO
INFORMATION WAS "PENDING" AT THE TIME, AS REQUIRED
BY THE STATUTE
A.

Introduction
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the

trial court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), Utah's intrastate speedy trial
statute. This provision, which outlines defendant's statutory speedy trial right, provides:

5
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(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.

(Emphasis added) (in Add. B).
Defendant argues that charges were necessarily "pending" against him on July 23,
1998, when he was arrested for three reasons: 1) because the case had been "adequately
investigated" before his arrest, implying that the State had all the information it needed to
charge and prosecute him at that point; 2) because the same charges were later included in
the parole violation information which served as the basis for revoking defendant's parole;
and 3) because defendant referred to the same charges in his written disposition request. Br.
of Aplt. at 5, 8-9. Consequently, defendant argues, the 120-day period started running from
the time he filed his demand on October 6, 1998, and any delay thereafter was not
attributable to "good cause" under the statute, and therefore required dismissal of all charges.

w
Because this claim involves statutory interpretation, it presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421.424 (Utah 1991). This Court need

*

3

Defendant does not claim that his constitutional rights to a speedy trial were
violated. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
6
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(

look only at the plain language of the statute to decide the issue as that language is clear and
unambiguous. State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998); State v. Harlev. 1999
UT App 197, ^10, 982 P.2d 1145 (it is well settled that '"when faced with a question of
statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute."1). The Court may
"resort to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language is ambiguous." State
v. Masciantonio. 850 P.2d 492,493 (Utah App. 1993).
B.

Background
Utah's speedy trial statute is designed to promote the prompt prosecution of charges

against prisoners, to ensure trial while witnesses are available and memories are fresh, and
to more precisely define "speedy trial" as it applies under our state constitution. State v.
Viles. 702 P.2d 1175.1176 (Utah 1985): State v. Wilson. 22 Utah 2d 361.453 P.2d 158,159
(Utah 1969) (addressing purpose of previous version of statute). The statute outlines the
responsibilities of both parties in bringing about a speedy resolution of charges. While the
prosecution carries the ultimate burden of bringing the matter to trial within 120 days of the
filing of a disposition request, defendant has the threshold burden of ensuring that the statute
is properly invoked. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 915-16 (Utah 1998) (when prisoner
delivers a written notice pursuant to the statute, then the prosecutor has an affirmative duty
to have the matter heard in 120 days; 120 days does not start until notice is properly
delivered under the statute); Petersen. 810 P.2d at 424 (describing prosecutor's burden);
State v. Wright. 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah 1987) (the request must be appropriately sent
7
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to the right people and contain an appropriate demand in order to be effective); Viles, 702
P.2d at 1175 (the burden is on the prisoner to give proper notice before being entitled to
have charges disposed of in the statutory period); Wilson, 453 P.2d at 160 (describing
prosecutor's burden). Moreover, once a defendant has properly invoked the statute to start
the 120-day period running-shifting the burden to the prosecution to ensure a timely trial-he
must not unduly delay matters or the delay may be charged against him and the 120-day
period extended. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916.
C.

The Statute's Plain Language Requires That Charges Be Filed Before A
Disposition Request Will Trigger The Speedy Trial Period
Under the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, a written request for

disposition is effective only if there is "pending against the prisoner in this state an[] untried
indictment or information^]" and the written request: 1) includes reference to the court in
which the charge is "pending"; and 2) seeks disposition of the "pending" charge. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (emphasis added). Without a pending information, a defendant is unable
to invoke the statute. Wright, 745 P.2d at 451 (defendant's ability to invoke the statute must
first be "triggered" by having a charge filed against him) (citing State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah
2d 435, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (1974)).
Black's Law Dictionary 1134 (6th ed. 1990), defines "pending" as follows:
Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusions of; prior to the
completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment. >
Awaiting an occurrence or conclusion f action, period of continuance or
indeterminacy. Thus, an action or suit is "pending" from its inception until the
rendition of final judgment.
8
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Thus, an action must have "begun" or commenced before it is "pending."
This interpretation is supported by law in this and other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Utah
R. Crim P. 5 (requiring that "all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or
infraction shall be commenced by the filing of an information or the return of an indictment.
Prosecution by information shall be commenced before a magistrate having jurisdiction of
the offense alleged to have been committed unless otherwise provided by law."); State ex rel.
Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982) (prosecution of a felony by information
requires several steps: 1) screening of the case by the prosecutor; 2) authorization of the
prosecution, shown by the signature of the prosecutor on the information; 3) presentment of
the information to a magistrate; 4) subscribing and swearing to the information by the
complaining witness; and 5) filing of the information with the magistrate or court clerk);
State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 312 (Utah 1975) (citing with approval a Kansas case noting
that a request for disposition of a detainer under former section 77-65-1 is ineffective to
invoke the benefits of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act where it was
filed in a court which did not have criminal charges pending against him because the
information had not yet been filed) (discussing Brimer v. State, 195 Kan. 107,402 P.2d 789
(1965)); see also State v. Trujillo. 117 Utah 237, 214 P.2d 626, 631 (1950) (noting that an
accused "is brought under the power of the district court by the filing of the information");
Johnson v. McCauehan. Carter & Scharrer. 672 P.2d 221,222 (Colo. App. 1983) (an action

9
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is "pending" only after it is commenced by either filing a complaint with the court or by the
service of a summons).
Defendant's interpretation of "pending," on the other hand, creates a jurisdictional
problem. In Utah, felony criminal prosecutions are commenced by the filing of an
information. Utah R. Crim. P. 5; State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60, 61 (1970).
The statute directs the court to dismiss all charges if trial does not occur within 120 days after
proper notice. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). However, until the filing of an information,
the court has no jurisdiction over the prosecution and cannot dismiss any charges because
there is nothing to dismiss.
Also, under defendant's interpretation, the full 120 days could run before the
information is filed, as occurred here, thereby preventing the State from ever filing or trying
defendant on the charges. This, in effect, creates a 120-day statute of limitations in favor of
defendant for any crime, discovered or not, to commence on the happening of the latter of
two events: defendant's arrest, and the date of delivery of the written disposition request to
the proper authority. The prosecution could be barred from filing the charges, even though
the applicable statute of limitations had not yet run.
Imposing such a statute of limitations would, in many cases, require that a prosecutor
file charges before he or she was ready, thereby hampering felony investigations and
increasing the likelihood of under or over charging or even charging innocent people. See
State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711,713 (Utah 1985) (requiring that prosecutors file charges as

10
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*

soon as probable cause exists is unworkable; a prosecutor's delay in filing charges does not
violate defendant's right to a speedy trial where no tactical advantage is gained by the
prosecution). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected that the previous
version of the speedy rights statute creates such a statute of limitations. Farnsworth. 519
P.2dat246.
In short, nothing in the speedy trial statute suggests that it was meant to modify or
supercede the existing statutes of limitations for filing various charges. Rather, it only
provides that, once filed, the prosecutor must be vigilant in trying the charges promptly once
defendant properly invokes his speedy trial right. Accordingly, this statute gives defendant
no right to hasten a prosecutor's charging decision before the charges are filed, so long as
they are filed within the applicable limitations period. It is only after the charges are filed
that a prosecutor's good or bad faith in getting the charges tried within 120 days after a
properly-filed disposition request is open to scrutiny. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4).
Defendant stresses that the case against him had been "adequately investigated" by
a single officer prior to his arrest on July 23, 1998. Br. of Aplt. at 8-9. This, however, is
beside the point. The statute requires that an information, not charges, be "pending" at the
time he files his disposition request. The information is pending only once it is filed with the
court. Moreover, an "adequate investigation" for purposes of establishing probable cause to
arrest someone is significantly different from an investigation aimed at prosecuting someone
for multiple felonies. Defendant fails to recognize the subsequent scientific testing to which
11
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the evidence was subjected, including chemical and fingerprint analysis, and testing to
establish the firing capability of the "firearm" found in the box, none of which was
completed before to defendant's arrest (R. 333: 9; 336: 4-5; 337: 6-7, 11). Further, the
adequacy of the investigation at the time of an arrest does not change a prosecutor's charging
discretion or the four-year statute of limitations for filing.
Another problem with defendant's position is that a defendant may not know the
proper charges or court to include in his disposition request before the actual filing of the
information, risking the possibility that his written request is ineffective to properly invoke
the statute as to some or all of the charges. The charges against a defendant may multiply
or change during the course of an investigation, and the failure of defendant to include any
or all of the charges ultimately filed against him would prevent him from triggering the
statutory time period.4 Similarly, failure to properly identify in the written request "the court
wherein it [the charge] is pending" prevents defendant from invoking the statute. Utah Code
Ann. §77-29-1(1).

4

Defendant claims that the charges did not change but remained constant from his
* arrest, to the parole violation information, to his disposition request. Br. of Aplt. at 5.
However, the charges at each of these points are not identical: the disposition request
does not include all the charges noted at defendant's arrest and includes a charge not
noted in either the parole violation information or the final information; the final
information contains a charge not mentioned in the disposition request; and the parole
violation information does not mention the clandestine lab charge noted in all the other
written documents (R. 1-3, 50, 51, 54).
12
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I

Hence, defendant's interpretation of the statute opens the door to potential difficulties
that do not occur under the view that "pending" means the information u
the court. At that point, defendant knows the exact charges ai u I -

\ .

aic district

court has jurisdiction ovct flu nnitkL ami the sequence and timing of efforts to invoke the
statute arc known U» all.
D.

'

•; •'

'" •

" •:. -

A Premature Disposition Request Is A Nullity Under Utah Supreme Court
Precedent
In State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447,4 s 1 (I kali h»8/i ihr I >mli Supreme ('otnl expressly

recognized that Utah's speedy tiial statute reqilires the filing of an information or indictment
before subn i LSMOI i I; i written disposition request in order to trigger defendant's rights under
the statute: "[A]t the time the [written] inquiry [which defendant claimed was his disposition
request] was sent, defendant had not yet been charged with the Weber
no untried indictment or information was pen d i 111? a \ia i i v 11 lefendant. Thus, nothing triggered
the statutory light to deiti-md ii-i,11 on any "untried indictment or information." See also
Farnsworth, 519 P.2d at 246. Thus, a premature disposition request "is a nullity" and does
not trigger the time period provided under Utah's statute. State v. Clark, 2^

\i i

i 272,

501 P.2d274 (Utah 1972) (decide*; 1 utidti lln predecessor statute 77-<>S-?.).
In Clark, a eotnpllainl was signed and defendant was arrested on November 11,1971.
501 P.2d at 275. Because defendant was on parole, he was returned to prison. Id. Four days
later, defendant requested a final disposition of the matter noted in the complain!

Id.

Following a preliminary hearing on February 1. Ic)7 V defendant was hound met and an
13
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information filed on February 10, 1972, charging him with burglary. Id. Defendant was
arraigned and obtained a trial setting for February 25, 1972-more than ninety days after he
had filed his written request. Id. The day before trial, defendant moved to dismiss, claiming
that the trial was set beyond the statutory ninety days after he filed his request. Id. The trial
court granted the motion and dismissed the charge. Id, On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
held that untried charges were not "pending" at the time defendant filed his request because
the information had not yet been filed. Id. at 276. Specifically, the Court said, "We think
the State has ninety days from notice after an information or indictment has been filed in
which to bring the defendant to trial in a felony case." Id (emphasis added).
Other decisions from this and other jurisdictions support Clark's holding. See
Belcher, 475 P.2d at 61-62 (prisoner's statutory request for final disposition of indictment
or complaint was premature where no information or indictment charging the crimes was yet
filed; decided under previous version of statute); see also People v. Calhoon, 897 P.2d 855,
856-57 (Colo. App. 1994) (the existence of an untried indictment, information, or criminal
complaint is necessary before a prisoner may invoke the statutory speedy trial provisions);
State v. Cullen. 253 So.2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1971) (a written disposition request is a nullity
when it is filed prior to the return of an indictment); Dennis v. Morphonios, 252 So.2d 845,
845-46 (Fla. Dist. App. 1971) (as a matter of law, a written disposition request is ineffective
and a nullity when it is filed prior to the filing of an information).

14
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Defendant cites two cases, State v. Heaton and State v. Peterson, as supporting his
claim that "pending" as used in the speedy trial statute does not require tin: filing nt i
complaint, information or indictment to start
However, neither case suppoi

»••..!* •

* u. at 6-8.

:

In State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court focused on the
prosecutor's burden under the statute to ensure that trial occurred within L!0 days oi the
filing of the disposition request. However, unlike this case, Heaton kid been eharyed by a
properly filed information, arraigned, given appointed * i nmsel, and given a timely trial date
before lie filed Ins disposal nm request

Id. at 913-14. fhe issue addressed by the Utah

Supreme Court was whether the court-caused delay after the request constituted "good
cause" for extending the 120-day period. Id. at 915 17. Because charges were i (early
"pending" when Heaton filed his disposition request, thai ease is iinmateniil to the issue
before this Court.
Similarly, in State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). a properly filed information
charged the defendant six days before he filed his disposition request.

Id. at 422.

Accordingly, the Court was not concerned with whether charges vi ere pending a I die lime
the request was made i 11 s(\ >• i d, 111e Conrt.was coneernei i with the trial court's determination
defendar

aave properly filed a disposition request have a duty under the statute

15
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to object to the setting of a trial date beyond the 120-day period in order to preserve their
rights under the statute. Id at 424. Hence, Petersen is no more applicable than Heaton.5
Given Utah Supreme Court precedent requiring that an information befiledbefore a
written disposition request will trigger statutory rights, and given the unambiguous language
of the speedy trial statute, the trial court correctly held that charges are "pending" only after
the information isfiled.Defendant's disposition request was therefore premature and, hence,
null.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's convictions and sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <27 day of April, 2000.
JANGRAHAM
Attorney General

U4Z.

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

5

Moreover, Petersen is open to question in light of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in New York v. Hill.
U.S.
,
, 120 S. Ct. 659, 662-66
(2000) (defense counsel's explicit agreement to a trial date beyond the 180-day period
provided in the interstate equivalent of a uniform speedy trial statute constitutes a waiver
or abandonment of defendant's rights under the Agreement).
16
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UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 6A
1998 REPLACEMENT

Titles 58 and 58A

58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act,
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within
this state or any other location.
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second
degree felony.
History. C. 1953, 58-37d-4. e n a c t e d b y L.
1992, ch. 156, § 4; 1997, ch. 64, § 11.
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ANNOTATED

1999 Supplement

REPLACEMENT VOLUME 6A
1998 EDITION
Place in Pocket of Corresponding Bound Volume.

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance*
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
,
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
.
<
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

68

(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
r
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
• building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
•
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub- stance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
.-. (iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
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(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
' controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession qf, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
'
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;

(v) in a public park, amusement pant, arcaae, or recreation uwnci,
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
f.

History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985,
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92,
* 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 95, § 1;
ch. 50,
§ 2;
1989,
ch. BYU.
56, « 1; 1989, ch.
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errors.ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1;

1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990,
ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198,
* 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, § 1;
1996, ch. 1, 8 8; 1997, ch. 64, § 6; 1998, ch.
139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, § 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1.
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UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu' ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, 5 2.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM C

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FILED
MIROCJSTRICTCa'ar

33 APR 26 A!! 10: 22

NOTICE

AM/':REQU^ST1
ri.

FOR DISPOSITION

OF

PENDING CHARGES (S)
TO:

FREDERICK VANDERVEUR, DIRECTOR
UTAH STATE PRISON/CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
NOTICE is hereby given

do hereby
against

request

final

\KW.C

•?«*

request

ft

sth

/rll tkfct

C hx& are now pending
Popart.

in that

information

as required

by

Inmate^///J.o/u^J

I hereby
cP

certify

county,

this

of

me in

,

,

. date

the

to

with

the
such

other

of

J J.M/h*M
(Signature)

USP#
(/

a copy

(Cv^-Z/Tho^

of the foregoing
, i9m

Au thori zed^Agen t
Utah State
Prison
Draper,
Utah
)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j\ .

., County, and

notice

together

,

pending

law.

that I received

day of

now

against

.S/..C«M+y

authorities

1-1

Li A &-5 &> V

of Utah. , Charges

is hereby made that you forward

DATED this

I

of any charge(s)

in the State

appropriate

this

I,

disposition

me in any court

PoSS of A. C laAa^jfsAj

that

)/

NOTICE

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
GARY R. HEWARD, 5085
Deputy District Attorney
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
Screened by: G. R. Heward
Assigned to: NPE
- .
,pm§
DAO# 98012913
LtbLlt M. LCVJIO

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

BAIL: $100,000
Warrant/Release: Prison

-vsMICHAEL COLE LINDSEY
DOB 12/06/65,
AKA NONE
Address Unknown
OTN 10373512
SO# 156968

INFORMATION

Case.§9l9&L,S^ P S

Defendant.
The undersigned Detective McCarthy - West Valley City Police Department, Agency
Case No. 9839532, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the
crimes of:

foflll

COUNT I
JP CL
CLANDESTINE LAB, A -First Degree Felony, at 2904 West 3100 South, West Valley City,
Utah, on or about July 23, 1998, in violation of Title 58 Chapter 37d, Section 4(l)(a)
and/or (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, in that the defendant MICHAEL
COLE LINDSAY, a party to the offense, did possess a controlled substance precursor, to
wit: pseudoephedrine, iodine and/or phosphorus, with the intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation, or did possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation.
J^ftOTICE is hereby given that the defendant is subject to an ENHANCED PENALTY pursuant to
Title 58, chapter 37d, Sections 5(l)(d) and/or (f) and /or (g), in that the intended
laboratory operation was to or did, take place within 500 feet of a residence, place of
business, church, or school; and/or the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced
any amount of a specified controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine and/or the
intended clandestine laboratory was for the production of methamphetamine base.
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INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY
DAO No. 98012913
Page 2
* COUNT II
JJD^ POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second Degree
Felony, at 2904 West 3100 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July
23, 1998, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 503(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY, a party to the
offense, did have in his possession or under his custody or control a dangerous weapon,
to-wit: firearm, and defendant was on parole or probation for a felony.
COUNT III

^ W

/

UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a ^Fhird-Degree Felony, at
2904 West 3100 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 23, 1998, in
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY, a party to the offense,
did knowingly and intentionally have in his possession a controlled substance, to-wit*
. ._
methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance. €wNu£, b j?(0f/c{aypo% - cfaf^uJW*
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Detective McCarthy, Agent Bennion, and David Murdock

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this information on personal knowledge, Drug Enforcement
Administration Case No. ML 98-S048, Utah State Crime Lab # C19982767.
Agent Bennion, Officer Billy McCarthy West Valley Police Department, Denise Davis
AP&P, Karl Kennington AP&P, Lee Lindsay AP&P and Ed Blanchard AP&P.
1.
On July 23, 1998, Agent Bennion received information from an anonymous
source that MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY was involved in a clandestine laboratory.
2.
On July 23, 1998, Agents Bennion, Lund Kavanagh and Altenes responded to
MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S residence, 2904 West 3100 South, West Valley City, Utah to
assist Adult Probation and Parole Officers with a home visit. Adult Probation and Parole
Officers advised Agent Bennion that they suspected that a box located in the garage contained a
clandestine laboratory. A set of keys with a tag "DAD" contained a key to the master lock on the
box. The keys were tried and the box was opened. A search of the box revealed Red
Phosphorous, Ephedrine, Acetone and Alcohol . Also, various items of glassware, pumps,
clamps, funnels, pH test strips, condenser column, blasting caps, and emergency fuses were
found. During the search, a sawed off shotgun and shotgun shells were also located.
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3.

2904 West 3100 South is within 500 ft of a residence.

4.
According to CIB Bennion of the DEA/Metro the chemicals and precursors
located at 2904 West 3100 South are capable of producing methamphetamine and/or had
produced methamphetamine.
5.
The laboratory glassware located at MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S residence
was processed by members of the Utah State Crime Laboratory for the presence of latent
fingerprints. Latent fingerprints were located and compared to MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S
and found to be a match.
6.
A quantity of methamphetamine was located at MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S
residence, along with paraphernalia consistent with the use/distribution of methamphetamine.
/ Defendant currently in Utah State Prison — Order to Produce /
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GARY R. HEWARD - 5085
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM-1231
Utah Attorney General
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 524-4156

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SALT LAKE COUNTY

^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTArf

/

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY

Case No. 991904523 FS
Judge William W. Berrett

Defendant.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered
that Defendant Michael Cole Lindsey's Motion to Dismiss is denied.
Dated this £

day ofJjpr£ji999.

m^v.
V;

Judge William W. berrett

.-«*.$'»'* ?•*; ., r
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GARY R. HEWARD - 5085
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM-1231
Utah Attorney General
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 524-4156
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATEOFUTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY

Case No. 991904523 FS
Judge William W. •DcrrctU

Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing on April 19,1999, on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. Defendant was represented by his counsel of record James A. Valdez and the State of
Utah was represented by Gary R. Heward. The court having heard oral argument makes the
following:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 23,1998, Defendant Michael Cole Lindsay was arrested in Salt Lake

County, Utah for possession of a Clandestine Laboratory. Mr. Lindsay was booked into Salt
Lake County Jail.
2.

On July 23, 1998, Defendant Michael Cole Lindsey was a paroleefromthe Utah

State Prison. Michael Cole Lindsay was returned to the Utah State Prison based upon the August
3, 1998 filing of a parole violation by agents of the Adult Probation and Parole Office and the
charge alleged to have occurred on July 23,1998 was one of the basis of his parole revocation.
3.

Michael Cole Lindsey's parole violation alleged the Clandestine Laboratory

charge, along with illegally possessing and/or manufacturing firearms and explosive devices.
4.

Michael Cole Lindsey filed a Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending

Charges pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 et seq. on October 6, 1998.
5.

Michael Cole Lindsey was charged by information on or about March 2, 1999,

alleging a First Degree Felony, Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory occurring on July 23,
1998.
6.

Michael Cole Lindsey filed a Pro Se Motion to Dismiss the prosecution of

possession of a clandestine laboratory asserting his right to a speedy trial and alleging a "lack of
seasonal prosecution" on Mach 30,1999.
7.

On April 6, 1999, James A. Valdez attorney for Defendant Michael Cole Lindsey

filed a Motion to Dismiss the prosecution alleging a violation of Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1
2
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et seq. which requires the State to bring the defendant to trial within 120 days of receiving notice
from the defendant requesting disposition of pending charges.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The controlling statute is Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 et seq.

2.

The Court finds that the 120 day requirement of Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1

et seq. is triggered by an information or indictment existing or pending against the defendant.
The date of defendant's arrest and/or his filing of a request for disposition of detainer prior to
charges being filed is irrelevant for purposes of calculating the time requirement set forth in §7729-1.
3.

Michael Cole Lindsey'srightto be tried within 120 days of filing notice begins to

run on the issuance of the arrest warrant by the magistrate. The arrest warrant was signed on
March 2,1999.
DATED t h i s ^ O

day of April, 1999.

JARWJJEWARD

AssistanrAttorney General
Approved as to form:

tomey for Defendant \
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SCOTT W. REED, USB #4124
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM, USB #1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1800

F ( U 0 DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL 16 195

GARYR.HEWARD
Assistant Attorney General
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 524-4156

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.

':

MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY,

:

Case No. 991904523 FS

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant,

The matter having come before the court on July 9,1999 for hearing on the Defendant's
Motion to Renew Motion to Dismiss, and both parties appearing through counsel, and arguments
having been made and the court now being fully apprised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon violation
of the Utah Detainer Statute, Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-29-1 et. sea., is denied, and the court
approves and adopts the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge Barrett,
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00151

acting as magistrate, dated May 3,1999.

is /fefeavcof July, 1999
DATED this

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to
Defendant's counsel, Kristine M. Rogers, 10 West 100 South, Suite 605, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

